Introduction
The current
revolution in the nation of Syria started out to be an egalitarian political
reform movement intended to democratize the government and improve political
representation. Following the violent response by the Alawite dominated Ba’ath
party under Bashar al Assad; the revolution is turning into a sectarian
blood-bath pitting minority Alawite against the Sunni majority. The purpose of
this paper is to examine the division between the Alawite and Sunni sects,
discuss the ascension to power in Syria by the Alawites and how this has
contributes to the current Syrian Civil War.
The Muslim
Alawite sect composes a sizable minority in Syria, consisting of about 11-12% (Fildis 2012) of the population.
Yet Alawites hold the key governmental positions including military and
security postings. The majority of people in Syria are Sunni Muslims (Middle East
Reporter 2011),
and Sunnis constitute the vast majority of the resistance to the current regime
led. However since the 1960’s the Alawites, once a discriminated minority
group, have held the reins of power in Syria.
Analysis
1.
Alawite Religion
The Alawite
Muslim sect is thought of as a heterodox or unorthodox religious sect of Islam.
Regarded as an offshoot of Shi’ism however this appears to be more a marriage
of convenience. Little is known about the Alawi sect and what is known seems to
suggest it is more a stand-alone religion incorporating other beliefs along
with Islam/Shiite Islam.
There are
similarities between Alawism and Shi’ism, such as a similar interpretation of
Islamic history and respect to Ali (Middle East Reporter 2011); however they have a
version of the trinity similar in concept to the Christian Trinity. The Alawi
trinity is made up of God/Allah, Muhammad, and Ali, believing that
all three are divine (Middle East Reporter 2011). The Alawites
observe Ramadan but do not fast or engage in public prayer believing these acts
are unnecessary, so long as they remain true to their faith. Similar to the
Druze, another mysterious unorthodox Muslim sect; the Alawites believe in
reincarnation, the religion is taught in secret by an Alawi cleric to
adolescents to whom the young initiates are to remain loyal to for the rest of
their lives. Women are preferred but not obligated to be veiled, and
surprisingly, the secrets of the religion are transmitted only to Alawite men. According
to Louis Massignon (1883-1963) an old school Orientalist, Alawism is a “form of
Islam that is deeply influenced by Christianity, Gnosticism, old Persian
religions and Sufism,” (Middle East
Reporter 2011, 16)
2.
Syrian Alawite
History
Alawites
have been persecuted off and on throughout their history, and have tended to
band together in enclaves, in easily defended remote areas like the mountainous
regions of Turkey, and Syria. For many years the Alawite were a poor,
under-educated minority in Syria. Largely marginalized and ignored they were
treated as non-Muslims under the Ottomans and as such had to pay a special tax (Middle East
Reporter 2011).
The end of World War One brought a French Mandate to govern/rule in the
aftermath of the Ottoman downfall. The French sought to use a strategy of
sectarian division to enhance their control of the region, and as a counter
point to the largely Sunni Arab nationalist movement they perceived as a threat
to the mandate. The Alawites benefitted from this as they, and the Druze were
treated to a more friendly relationship in exchange for loyalty to the French government (Fildis 2012). The Alawites became
the trusted sect and many joined the military and the police forces, including
the Troupes Speciales du Levant (Fildis 2012) a type of native
constabulary composed primarily of minorities and used to put down revolts,
insurrections and to maintain order (Fildis 2012). Over time however
the Alawites along with Circassians and others dominated the rank and file of
the, military and police forces however were underrepresented in the officer
ranks and in government. The French approach to “divide and rule” (Fildis 2012) created a sense of
regionalism and rivalry between sects. This and other actions by the French
government prevents the development of a sense of national identity and loyalty
to the state, and sets the stage for the Alawite revolts that took place after
the end of the mandate government and Syrian independence in 1946.
3.
Ba’ath Party
The Ba’ath
or Resurrection party was founded in the 1940’s by a few European-educated Syrian
intellectuals (Fildis 2012) and was intended as
a pan-Arab political movement, however was a secular movement, as opposed to
pan-Arabism (Fildis 2012), or Arab nationalism
popularized by the more populous Sunni’s and largely considered by minority
sects as an excuse for Sunni political control (Hinnebusch 2012). The secular nature
of the Ba’ath movement attracted many Alawites including a strong military
faction who maintained a few secret Ba’ath organizations during the brief time
of the Syrian-Egyptian Union when it was outlawed (Hinnebusch
2012).
However after the Union was dissolved in 1961, the Ba’ath party had a strong
faction of Alawites in leadership who took control of the party and later, the
Syrian government in a bloody coup de’ tat July of 1963 (Fildis 2012). Hafiz al Assad, father
of Bashar al Assad, was one of the officers who led the coup. This takeover by the
Alawite minority, led to bad feelings between the sects and a sense of
distrust, and of governmental illegitimacy by many Sunnis (Fildis 2012).
4.
The Revolt
In
February of 2011 a revolt began against inequities by the al Assad regime. This
revolt was, on the surface at least, a response by the Syrian people to the
successful protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and the NATO backed Libyan Civil War
which saw the end of three of the long-time Middle Eastern regimes. Initially a
peaceful protest sparked by the torture related deaths of three young boys who
wrote anti-regime graffiti. The protesters demanded justice and an end to the
one party Ba’ath system of government. After police and troops responded
violently, killing hundreds, even thousands of unarmed protesters, an armed
revolt began. Troops and officers having deserted the regular Syrian Army
formed a loose collection of paramilitary organizations referred to as the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) and although militarily much weaker than Assad’s forces,
began fighting the regime.
However as
the revolt continues to unfold a sectarian divide between Alawites loyal to the
regime, and backed by many Christian loyalists, are facing off against the
largely Sunni members of the FSA. Additionally there is a tribal component to
the Alawi that may pre-date the protests and the so called Arab Spring.
5.
Tribes
Although
the Syrians are a reasonably modern and well educated people, millions of
Syrians have a strong tribal affiliation (Terrorism Monitor 2012). The Alawite
government controlled by the Assad clan has tended to marginalize the Sunni
Arab tribesmen, especially in the rural areas where the Sheiks and their
followers have been left to their own and ignored, even marginalized. Many are
rural people who make their living by farming, however a drought that has
affected many rural areas since 2003 (Terrorism Monitor 2012) has greatly reduced
their ability to subsist or take care of their families. The regime ignores
them and has left them to wither as the weather makes exacerbates their
hardships. Sunnis, they do not get the same consideration as Alawites facing
similar troubles. This has led to large
scale support by the Syrian Sunni tribes for the revolt against the regime. Tribal
networks cross international lines and many tribes such as the Shammar,
Baggara, Jabbour, Dulaim and the Ougaidat (Terrorism Monitor 2012) in the East and the
Northeast of Syria have involved their kinsmen from Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Terrorism
Monitor 2012).
However not
all of the tribes have gone with the rebels, some of the Sunni tribes have
sided with the Assad regime and even have been enrolled in the shadowy, violent
Shabiha militia (Terrorism Monitor 2012).
6.
Shabiha
Shabiha
loosely translated means phantom-like, (Stratfor 2012) and refers to the
thugs employed by the Assad regime to carry out their dirty work. In existence
since 1976 the Shabiha were originally smugglers moving goods illegally between
Syria and Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. Composed mostly of Alawites
from the Latakia region (some Sunnis) the Shabiha traded loyalty to the regime
for immunity for their illegal activities, now more a paramilitary organization
they are armed by the regime and bussed into any region where protests or armed
ant-regime activity is occurring. They use unrestricted violence against anyone
suspected of ties to the resistance or the FSA (Stratfor 2012). They are suspected
in many massacres including the Houla Massacre and of torturing prisoners
including women and children. The Shabiha as a mostly Alawite organization back
the Alawite regime, however the Army is also broken down on sectarian lines
with the officer corps composed of more
Alawites than Sunnis, and the Republican Guard, elite Fourth Division and the
Special Forces ( Terrorism Monitor 2011) being almost
entirely Alawite. The Sectarian divide is impossible to ignore.
Conclusions
The
ongoing civil war in Syria is in many ways a result of the sectarian and tribal
differences between the Alawites and Sunnis. The differences between the two
sects have been aggravated for centuries starting with the Ottoman persecution
of the Alawites and then the French divide and conquer strategy during the
mandate era. These strategies both served to divide the minority sects from the
Sunni majority and have led to both the Alawi coup in 1963, the same divisions
continued with the Assad regime(s) under or mis-representing the Sunnis. The
secular nature of the Ba’ath party should have led to an environment conducive
to a Syrian national identity however Syria, like much of the Middle East
maintains strong tribal affiliations that cross international boundaries and
are often tied to sect identification. The Alawites having been isolated in
remote villages cling to power out of fear of a Sunni dominated government that
would return to the persecution of minorities. It is also for this reason that
many Christians side with the regime (Starr and Akminas 2012). Only a truly
representative government can break this cycle of tribal-sect based violent
domination. The initial outbreak of protests in 2011 purported to be that,
however they were and are Sunni dominated and many Christians reported the
protesters chanted anti-Alawi, anti-Christian slogans, “Christians to Beirut,
Alawites to the coffin,” (Starr and Akminas 2012). There has been some
support from Salafi clerics for the revolt and the introduction of some suicide
bombings suggest a possible involvement by Al Qaeda. However there is little
evidence to suggest the rebels are actively involved with either and may in
fact represent nothing more than opportunistic involvement by the Salafi
inspired Al Qaeda (Starr and Akminas 2012).
In the
event of a rebel victory whoever comes to power in Syria needs to avoid making
the same mistakes made by the current and previous governments. A real attempt
at representative and preferably secular government must be made. Otherwise the
cycle of one sect and/or tribe oppressing the other will continue. Lastly a new
government will benefit by avoiding the pitfalls of a Sharia based extremist government
like Saudi Arabia, Iran or even worse, Afghanistan under the Taliban. A
government that truly builds on lasting inter-sect and inter-tribal
relationships that can lead to a sense of Syrian nationhood will benefit all
the peoples of Syria.
Works Cited
Terrorism Monitor. "Alawi Control of the Syrian
Military Key to Regime's Survival." Terrorism Monitor, 2011: 1-2.
Fildis, Ayse Tekdal.
"Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria." Vol. XIX. no. No. 2.
Summer 2012. 148-156.
Hinnebusch, Raymond.
"Syria: From "Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?" International
Affairs, 2012: 95-133.
Middle East Reporter.
"Muslim Alawites: A Profile." The Middle East Reporter , 2011:
15-17.
Starr, Stephen, and S.
Akminas. "Syrian Christians Keep an Uneasy Alliance with Assad." Christian
Century, 2012: 19.
Stratfor . "The
Use of Mercenaries in Syria's Crackdown." Stratfor Analysis, 2012:
47.
Terrorism Monitor.
"Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian
Uprising." Terrorism Monitor, 2012: 9-12.
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