Sunni/Alawite Divisions in Syria and its Impact on the Ongoing Civil War

Introduction

            The current revolution in the nation of Syria started out to be an egalitarian political reform movement intended to democratize the government and improve political representation. Following the violent response by the Alawite dominated Ba’ath party under Bashar al Assad; the revolution is turning into a sectarian blood-bath pitting minority Alawite against the Sunni majority. The purpose of this paper is to examine the division between the Alawite and Sunni sects, discuss the ascension to power in Syria by the Alawites and how this has contributes to the current Syrian Civil War.

            The Muslim Alawite sect composes a sizable minority in Syria, consisting of about 11-12% (Fildis 2012) of the population. Yet Alawites hold the key governmental positions including military and security postings. The majority of people in Syria are Sunni Muslims (Middle East Reporter 2011), and Sunnis constitute the vast majority of the resistance to the current regime led. However since the 1960’s the Alawites, once a discriminated minority group, have held the reins of power in Syria.

Analysis

1.      Alawite Religion

            The Alawite Muslim sect is thought of as a heterodox or unorthodox religious sect of Islam. Regarded as an offshoot of Shi’ism however this appears to be more a marriage of convenience. Little is known about the Alawi sect and what is known seems to suggest it is more a stand-alone religion incorporating other beliefs along with Islam/Shiite Islam.

            There are similarities between Alawism and Shi’ism, such as a similar interpretation of Islamic history and respect to Ali (Middle East Reporter 2011); however they have a version of the trinity similar in concept to the Christian Trinity. The Alawi trinity is made up of   God/Allah, Muhammad, and Ali, believing that all three are divine (Middle East Reporter 2011). The Alawites observe Ramadan but do not fast or engage in public prayer believing these acts are unnecessary, so long as they remain true to their faith. Similar to the Druze, another mysterious unorthodox Muslim sect; the Alawites believe in reincarnation, the religion is taught in secret by an Alawi cleric to adolescents to whom the young initiates are to remain loyal to for the rest of their lives. Women are preferred but not obligated to be veiled, and surprisingly, the secrets of the religion are transmitted only to Alawite men. According to Louis Massignon (1883-1963) an old school Orientalist, Alawism is a “form of Islam that is deeply influenced by Christianity, Gnosticism, old Persian religions and Sufism,” (Middle East Reporter 2011, 16)

2.      Syrian Alawite History

            Alawites have been persecuted off and on throughout their history, and have tended to band together in enclaves, in easily defended remote areas like the mountainous regions of Turkey, and Syria. For many years the Alawite were a poor, under-educated minority in Syria. Largely marginalized and ignored they were treated as non-Muslims under the Ottomans and as such had to pay a special tax (Middle East Reporter 2011). The end of World War One brought a French Mandate to govern/rule in the aftermath of the Ottoman downfall. The French sought to use a strategy of sectarian division to enhance their control of the region, and as a counter point to the largely Sunni Arab nationalist movement they perceived as a threat to the mandate. The Alawites benefitted from this as they, and the Druze were treated to a more friendly relationship in exchange for loyalty to the French government (Fildis 2012). The Alawites became the trusted sect and many joined the military and the police forces, including the Troupes Speciales du Levant (Fildis 2012) a type of native constabulary composed primarily of minorities and used to put down revolts, insurrections and to maintain order (Fildis 2012). Over time however the Alawites along with Circassians and others dominated the rank and file of the, military and police forces however were underrepresented in the officer ranks and in government. The French approach to “divide and rule” (Fildis 2012) created a sense of regionalism and rivalry between sects. This and other actions by the French government prevents the development of a sense of national identity and loyalty to the state, and sets the stage for the Alawite revolts that took place after the end of the mandate government and Syrian independence in 1946.

3.      Ba’ath Party

            The Ba’ath or Resurrection party was founded in the 1940’s by a few European-educated Syrian intellectuals (Fildis 2012) and was intended as a pan-Arab political movement, however was a secular movement, as opposed to pan-Arabism (Fildis 2012), or Arab nationalism popularized by the more populous Sunni’s and largely considered by minority sects as an excuse for Sunni political control (Hinnebusch 2012). The secular nature of the Ba’ath movement attracted many Alawites including a strong military faction who maintained a few secret Ba’ath organizations during the brief time of the Syrian-Egyptian Union when it was outlawed (Hinnebusch 2012). However after the Union was dissolved in 1961, the Ba’ath party had a strong faction of Alawites in leadership who took control of the party and later, the Syrian government in a bloody coup de’ tat July of 1963 (Fildis 2012). Hafiz al Assad, father of Bashar al Assad, was one of the officers who led the coup. This takeover by the Alawite minority, led to bad feelings between the sects and a sense of distrust, and of governmental illegitimacy by many Sunnis (Fildis 2012).  

4.      The Revolt

            In February of 2011 a revolt began against inequities by the al Assad regime. This revolt was, on the surface at least, a response by the Syrian people to the successful protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and the NATO backed Libyan Civil War which saw the end of three of the long-time Middle Eastern regimes. Initially a peaceful protest sparked by the torture related deaths of three young boys who wrote anti-regime graffiti. The protesters demanded justice and an end to the one party Ba’ath system of government. After police and troops responded violently, killing hundreds, even thousands of unarmed protesters, an armed revolt began. Troops and officers having deserted the regular Syrian Army formed a loose collection of paramilitary organizations referred to as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and although militarily much weaker than Assad’s forces, began fighting the regime.

            However as the revolt continues to unfold a sectarian divide between Alawites loyal to the regime, and backed by many Christian loyalists, are facing off against the largely Sunni members of the FSA. Additionally there is a tribal component to the Alawi that may pre-date the protests and the so called Arab Spring.

5.      Tribes  

            Although the Syrians are a reasonably modern and well educated people, millions of Syrians have a strong tribal affiliation (Terrorism Monitor 2012). The Alawite government controlled by the Assad clan has tended to marginalize the Sunni Arab tribesmen, especially in the rural areas where the Sheiks and their followers have been left to their own and ignored, even marginalized. Many are rural people who make their living by farming, however a drought that has affected many rural areas since 2003 (Terrorism Monitor 2012) has greatly reduced their ability to subsist or take care of their families. The regime ignores them and has left them to wither as the weather makes exacerbates their hardships. Sunnis, they do not get the same consideration as Alawites facing similar troubles.  This has led to large scale support by the Syrian Sunni tribes for the revolt against the regime. Tribal networks cross international lines and many tribes such as the Shammar, Baggara, Jabbour, Dulaim and the Ougaidat (Terrorism Monitor 2012) in the East and the Northeast of Syria have involved their kinsmen from Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Terrorism Monitor 2012).

            However not all of the tribes have gone with the rebels, some of the Sunni tribes have sided with the Assad regime and even have been enrolled in the shadowy, violent Shabiha militia (Terrorism Monitor 2012).

6.      Shabiha

            Shabiha loosely translated means phantom-like, (Stratfor 2012) and refers to the thugs employed by the Assad regime to carry out their dirty work. In existence since 1976 the Shabiha were originally smugglers moving goods illegally between Syria and Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. Composed mostly of Alawites from the Latakia region (some Sunnis) the Shabiha traded loyalty to the regime for immunity for their illegal activities, now more a paramilitary organization they are armed by the regime and bussed into any region where protests or armed ant-regime activity is occurring. They use unrestricted violence against anyone suspected of ties to the resistance or the FSA (Stratfor 2012). They are suspected in many massacres including the Houla Massacre and of torturing prisoners including women and children. The Shabiha as a mostly Alawite organization back the Alawite regime, however the Army is also broken down on sectarian lines with the officer corps composed of  more Alawites than Sunnis, and the Republican Guard, elite Fourth Division and the Special Forces ( Terrorism Monitor 2011) being almost entirely Alawite. The Sectarian divide is impossible to ignore.

Conclusions

            The ongoing civil war in Syria is in many ways a result of the sectarian and tribal differences between the Alawites and Sunnis. The differences between the two sects have been aggravated for centuries starting with the Ottoman persecution of the Alawites and then the French divide and conquer strategy during the mandate era. These strategies both served to divide the minority sects from the Sunni majority and have led to both the Alawi coup in 1963, the same divisions continued with the Assad regime(s) under or mis-representing the Sunnis. The secular nature of the Ba’ath party should have led to an environment conducive to a Syrian national identity however Syria, like much of the Middle East maintains strong tribal affiliations that cross international boundaries and are often tied to sect identification. The Alawites having been isolated in remote villages cling to power out of fear of a Sunni dominated government that would return to the persecution of minorities. It is also for this reason that many Christians side with the regime (Starr and Akminas 2012). Only a truly representative government can break this cycle of tribal-sect based violent domination. The initial outbreak of protests in 2011 purported to be that, however they were and are Sunni dominated and many Christians reported the protesters chanted anti-Alawi, anti-Christian slogans, “Christians to Beirut, Alawites to the coffin,” (Starr and Akminas 2012). There has been some support from Salafi clerics for the revolt and the introduction of some suicide bombings suggest a possible involvement by Al Qaeda. However there is little evidence to suggest the rebels are actively involved with either and may in fact represent nothing more than opportunistic involvement by the Salafi inspired Al Qaeda (Starr and Akminas 2012).

            In the event of a rebel victory whoever comes to power in Syria needs to avoid making the same mistakes made by the current and previous governments. A real attempt at representative and preferably secular government must be made. Otherwise the cycle of one sect and/or tribe oppressing the other will continue. Lastly a new government will benefit by avoiding the pitfalls of a Sharia based extremist government like Saudi Arabia, Iran or even worse, Afghanistan under the Taliban. A government that truly builds on lasting inter-sect and inter-tribal relationships that can lead to a sense of Syrian nationhood will benefit all the peoples of Syria.

           

Works Cited

Terrorism Monitor. "Alawi Control of the Syrian Military Key to Regime's Survival." Terrorism Monitor, 2011: 1-2.

Fildis, Ayse Tekdal. "Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria." Vol. XIX. no. No. 2. Summer 2012. 148-156.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Syria: From "Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?" International Affairs, 2012: 95-133.

Middle East Reporter. "Muslim Alawites: A Profile." The Middle East Reporter , 2011: 15-17.

Starr, Stephen, and S. Akminas. "Syrian Christians Keep an Uneasy Alliance with Assad." Christian Century, 2012: 19.

Stratfor . "The Use of Mercenaries in Syria's Crackdown." Stratfor Analysis, 2012: 47.

Terrorism Monitor. "Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising." Terrorism Monitor, 2012: 9-12.

The Impact of Jewish Terrorism in Palestine/Israel: both Historically and Today

The History of Israel is unfortunately a violent one. Terrorism in or out of Israel  is not confined to the Intifada’s of the Palestinians or the current global Islamic Jihad, nor is it confined to any one specific religion, ideology or political movement. Jewish terrorism also is a factor in the holy land. Jewish Terrorism has both ancient and contemporary roots, the Sicarians in ancient Rome, the Irgun/Lehi and others in the Palestine-Mandate era and now from right-wing Jewish extremists who assassinated a Prime Minister, committed acts of terror against civilians, and establish illegal settlements in the Palestinian Territories.

Ancient History

            The history of terrorism in Israel is a long reaches back to the First Century C.E. during the Roman occupation. The Sicarians, named for the dagger they used (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009), are the earliest identifiable Jewish terrorist organization. A resistance movement opposed to Roman occupation of Judea they were involved in kidnappings, assassinations, and asymmetric warfare. These acts were intended to provoke aggression by the Roman garrison against the local populace, in turn fomenting rebellion against Rome (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). The Sicarians most notable moment in history was the occupation of the fortress at Masada. The story of the siege by Roman Procurator Flavius Silva, and the alleged mass suicide of the Masada garrison, including their families are well known (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). Some evidence indicates it may in fact have been a mass homicide carried out by the male members of the garrison, killing their own family members, with a smaller squad sized element (approximately 10 men) killing the rest in turn. Interestingly the Apostle Judas may have been a member of the Sicarians, his family name; Iscariot may be a variation of the word sicarii, a reference to the preferred weapon of the Sicarians, at least according to one theory presented in a History Channel documentary about the life of the Apostles. 

Palestine Mandate Era

            During the era of the British Mandate (1919-1948) several Jewish terrorist organizations developed. These groups arose out of the violence between Palestinians and Jews, and attempts by the Mandate government to manage the conflict, and their restriction of Jewish immigration to Palestine (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). The most notable of these terrorist organizations were the: Haganah/ Palmach, Irgun, and the Lehi also called the “Stern gang (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            The Haganah/Palmach was initially created as the paramilitary defense service of the Jewish communities in pre-Israeli Palestine (Wagner, 2008), the most organized of these organizations and the one that comes closest to a legitimate “resistance” force. Composed of Air, Marine, Intelligence sections and regional commands the Haganah was in some ways a blueprint for the Israeli Defense Forces (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). The Haganah had a “left” leaning political identity; the Palmach was part of the Haganah and often contained the best trained military members from the Haganah (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            The Irgun, a right wing group was less trained or organized than the Haganah. Formed in 1931 after a political disagreement by some of the then serving Haganah officers, due to the leftist-leaning politics in that organization (Wagner, 2008).

            The Lehi, formed by former Irgun member, Avraham Stern, was the smallest of the three, composed at its height of approximately 800 members (Neff, 2006). They were not a disciplined force and while all three engaged in terrorism, the Stern Gang was the most brutal. Going further to the right than the Irgun, the Lehi was influenced by European fascism and is known to have “shared Hitler’s totalitarian ideology” (Neff, 2006), and “openly celebrated Nazi victories” (Neff, 2006). At least until they had a better understanding of the homicidal, anti-Semitic of the Third Reich  (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            These organizations were involved in many terrorist attacks during the mandate era, some of the most notable were: The King David Hotel bombing in 1946 (Wagner, 2008), assassination of UN Security Council Member Swedish Count Folke-Bernadotte in 1948 (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009), and the grisly but largely unheard of (in the West) massacre in the village of Deir Yassin (Hogan, 2001).

            The village of Deir Yassin was located just outside of Jerusalem, it was an Arab village that ironically had established an agreement to refrain from violence with neighboring Jewish villages (Hogan, 2001) , and had provided intelligence to the Haganah and cooperated during the Haganah’s taking of the strategic Sherafa Ridge (Hogan, 2001). The Deir Yassin Massacre was chiefly an Irgun and Lehi operation, with some assistance from the better trained Palmach. The Deir Yassin attack was intended as a revenge operation for acts committed by Arabs in previous engagements. No Arabs from Deir Yassin were ever identified as having taken part in any anti-Zionist combat or terrorist activities. The Irgun and Lehi officers were intent on spreading fear among the Arab population by “liquidating all the men of the village and any other force that opposed them,” (Hogan, 2001). In fact the attack became an uncontrolled massacre, with Irgun and Lehi operatives killing anyone in the village, including non-combatant men, women, children and at least two documented stabbings of pregnant women (Hogan, 2001) many of whom were offering no resistance. The village had a watch-system as part of their attempt to both maintain security and insure compliance with the non-aggression agreement with the Haganah. There were a few armed men, most likely members of the village watch, which resisted (their right to do so as they were attacked while compliantly in their village). The resistance, such as it was, stopped or slowed down for a time the amateur irregulars of the combined Irgun/Lehi attacking force. The Deir Yassin resistance was eventually eliminated by a unit from the Palmach who briefly arrived and finished them with house to house fighting. Prisoners were taken, however many prisoners did not make it and were executed, some by formal firing squad (Hogan, 2001), many were just shot for no apparent purpose but to satisfy the victors blood-lust (Hogan, 2001), an eye-witness Meir Pa’il stated, “groups of armed guerrillas, eyes glazed running about full of lust for murder” (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). There was some evidence of the female villagers being raped (Hogan, 2001) although due to the stigma associated with sexual abuse in Arab culture not enough evidence has been collected to identify the extent of sexual abuse at Deir Yassin (Hogan, 2001).

            The death toll has been given as 254 (Hogan, 2001), however in recent research indicates the number killed was likely no higher than 140 (Hogan, 2001). The number for wounded is given at between 50 and 70. In typical battle conditions these numbers would be reversed, with more wounded than killed.

            The Irgun and Lehi both intended to make a statement with this assault, by killing the men in the village, and sowing fear among the Arabs in general. This would have been enough to qualify the attack as an act of terror, however given the bad quality of the under-trained “troops” under Irgun/Lehi command that day a massacre was almost inevitable.

Jewish terrorism in Israel today

            There have been multiple issues with Jewish terrorism in recent years in Israel. While the focus on terrorism in the Holy Land is on the stone-throwers of the Intifada, suicide-bombers and rockets from Hamas, or Hezbollah, however Jewish extremism and accompanying acts of terrorism not only continue but are on the rise. Islamic extremism and Palestinian national identity movements are certainly a serious danger to Israel extremists. Jewish terrorism is also a rising danger to the safety of both the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and to the Israeli state itself, as these issues impact the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there is a ripple effect that may be felt globally.

            The settler movement is a combination of right-wing extremism and Jewish religious zealotry. There are continuing clashes between armed settlers and unarmed Palestinian villagers. The Jewish settlers are often, although not always, backed by the IDF and the Israeli legal establishment. The settlers in the Hebron region of the West Bank ascribe to a philosophy of complete separation between Arabs and Israelis, and for settlement of the whole of Eretz Israel (land of Israel) which would include the Sinai, and the country of Jordan.

             A man named Meir Kahane, a rabbi who had established the Jewish Defense League in New York in 1968, and some of his followers had relocated to Israel where they were initially welcomed by other Zionist organizations but ultimately re-buffed by the more established political and religious Zionist movements such as the Gush Emunim. Rabbi Kahane felt a close kinship to the right wing Herut movement headed by Menachim Begin, Kahane felt betrayed when Begin signed the peace accords between Israel and Egypt, this marked a turning point where Kahane and his followers turned away from the State of Israel and created a mental image of a new kingdom of Judea that would someday replace modern Israel..

            The Kahanist movement also referred to as the Kach, were involved in many terror operations. The affair in the Sinai in 1982 where Kahanist followers threatened suicide if the IDF implemented evacuation plans in accordance with the agreement between Israel and Egypt is an example of the level of commitment of the movements members. Kahane, who was out of town, was actually called in by the army to talk the would-be suicidal “martyrs” out of following through on the threat of suicide. Several incidents with a sub-group of Kahanists called the Committee for the Safety of the Roads, often targeted Palestinians in the refugee camps, and put the Kahanists at odds with the IDF who were often forced to disperse them with tear gas and rubber bullets.

            One of the worst episodes of Jewish terrorism in Israeli history was committed by a Kahanist and close personal friend of Meir Kahane.

            On a February morning Dr. Baruch Goldstein a physician and reserve medical officer in the IDF entered a holy site in Hebron called the Cave of the Patriarchs, revered by Jews and Muslims alike.  Wearing his IDF uniform Dr. Goldstein opened fire with a Galil automatic rifle on unarmed Palestinians praying in the cave. Using a combination of gunfire and grenade attacks, he killed 29, and wounded 125 Palestinians, the attack continued until Goldstein was overwhelmed while re-loading his Galil, and beaten to death with a fire extinguisher by some others in the cave who were unwounded. This incident set off a chain reaction of confrontation throughout the West Bank resulting in the death of 20 more Palestinians and 120 more wounded. The response by the Palestinians to the massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs while not in response to a sanctioned government operation does in some ways resemble the “boomerang effect” described by Boaz Ganor in his book the Counter-Terrorism Puzzle (Ganor, 2005).

            Rabbi Kahane was eventually assassinated leading to his followers committing several reprisal attacks against random Palestinians having no involvement in his murder. The followers of Kahane were following the idea of Halakha or Jewish Law, and a desire to return to an earlier time of a traditional Jewish/Judean kingdom, the occupation of additional lands, violent retribution against the “infidel” Palestinians, along with the decentralization of their violent movement, makes them in many ways similar to the members of the Salafist inspired Global Jihad.

            The Gush Emunim was the earlier religious-extremist settler movement. Gush Emunim, Hebrew for bloc of faithful, consisting of religious-Zionist members who wished to settle all of the lands of Eretz Israel, the organization ceased to exist in the 1980’s. Members were involved in aborted plots to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount; other members were involved in the massacre at the Islamic college (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            The Islamic College in Hebron was attacked in July 1983. Members of the Gush Emunim, also called the Jewish Underground attacked the college using small-arms and hand grenades, killing three and wounding thirty-three more (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin P.M. of Israel

            On November 4^th, 1995 the Prime Minister of Israel was assassinated. The assassination took place at close range by a pistol wielding religious-Zionist named Yigal Amir (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). Amir was angry over the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords and he and his comrades wished to strike out at the man and the state that they felt sold out their vision of Jewish statehood. While he did act alone on the day of the assassination he was supported by a network of fellow extremists who were part of the Jewish settler movement (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009). This was the first time an Israeli head of state was assassinated and also represents the first major instance of open defiance by Israeli Jews directed at the state of Israel. Amir was immediately arrested, every member of his cell was arrested shortly thereafter (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            The Settler movement continues and is very active in Hebron, however is not exclusive to Hebron. Clashes between settlers and Palestinians are on the increase, and appear to be occurring weekly if not daily. IDF General Avi Mizrahi stated, “That unchecked Jewish terror against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank threatens to plunge the territory into another conflict” (Stewart, 2011). General Mizrahi goes on to say “What's happening in the field is terrorism; it needs to be dealt with" (Stewart, 2011). Additionally the General states “The Israel Defense Forces fears terrorism against Palestinians is likely to ignite the territories" (Stewart, 2011). Even the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu has had concerns about the violence and extremism of the settler movement. “Following the arrest of a West Bank settler suspected of multiple murders and bomb attacks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that Israel must fight the terror posed by violent extreme rightists, whom he termed a "marginal minority,” (Haaretz Service, 2009).

            In the West bank town of Nablus more attacks by settlers against the Palestinians were reported today the 27^th of May, 2012. Settlers from the illegal Yitzhar settlement on Palestinian lands south of Nablus burning dozens of acres of farmland planted with olive trees, fruits, and vegetables (Bannoura, 2012) (Bannoura, 2012). Clashes erupted between the settlers and Palestinian villagers, with troops from the IDF intervening (Bannoura, 2012). However IDF soldiers are often sympathetic to the settlers and in this case there are reports of IDF troops moving into other villages in the surrounding areas and arresting Palestinians (Bannoura, 2012). The cause for these arrests is unclear; however the instigation is due to the confrontations provoked by the Israeli settlers.

Conclusion

            Jewish Terrorism has a long history, while mostly confined to the lands of Palestine/Israel it has been as dangerous and de-stabilizing as any brand of terrorism before or since. In the days of the Palestinian-British mandate the Lehi, Irgun, and Haganah directly influenced the British decision to leave Palestine (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009).

            Today Jewish right-wing extremists are pushing the settler agenda and threatening what is left of the peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The Oslo accords might as well have never been signed. Like all extremists a shift from the radical ideology is necessary in order to defeat them. The current wave of Jewish terrorism may still be manageable given its relative size and containment in Israel. However the Israeli government must stop coddling the settlers and playing to their agenda. This conflict has global ramifications as the treatment of Palestinians by Israel, and acceptance of the Israeli government’s policies toward the Palestinians by the US is a key motivation for recruitment to the global Islamic jihad. The reduction of the dispute between the Israelis, and the Palestinians is a key component to reducing the global war on terror.  

                                                           

                                                            References

Bannoura, S. (2012, May 27). Settlers Attack Villages Near Nablus, Resident Wounded. Retrieved from International Middle East media center: http://www.imemc.org/article/63581

Ganor, B. (2005). The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.

Haaretz Service. (2009, November). Netanyahu: 'Minority' of violent far-rightists must be stopped. Retrieved from Haaretz web site: http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-minority-of-violent-far-rightists-must-be-stopped-1.4995

Hogan, M. (2001). The 1948 massacre at Deir Yassin revisited. Retrieved from APUS Online Library: ebscohost.com

Neff, D. (2006). Hamas: A pale image of the Jewish irgun and lehi gangs. Washington report on middle east affairs . Retrieved from APUS Online Library: ebscohost.com

Pedahzur, A., & Perliger, A. (2009). Jewish terrorism in Israel . New York: Columbia University Press.

Stewart, C. (2011, July). Jewish settlers are terrorising Palestinians, says Israeli general. Retrieved from The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/jewish-settlers-are-terrorising-palestinians-says-israeli-general-2315435.html

Wagner, S. (2008). British intelligence and the Jewish resistance movement in the Palestine mandate,1945-46 . Intelligence and National Security, 629-657.

Terrorism; No Universal Definition

Defining terrorism is difficult in many ways. It is important to define terrorism so that governmental organizations, and others charged with handling counter-terrorism can appropriately respond. It is also important for the average citizen in order to understand terrorism, and the responses to the threat. However defining terrorism remains an elusive and problematic phenomenon, in some ways defining terrorism is as shadowy and difficult to pin down as the actual terrorists themselves.

            After having read the assignments from both textbooks and then making comparisons of several definitions of terrorism there is a trend for how terrorism is viewed and defined. My definition is: The intentional use of violence or threat of violence by any non-state actor individual or organization, which specifically targets non-combatants/civilians with the intention of promoting a political or social agenda.

            This definition of course fails to take into consideration the adage “one person’s terrorist another’s freedom fighter” (Mahan & Griset, 2008, p. 17). Which then always brings the discussion to where is the line drawn between a guerrilla or insurgent fighter and a terrorist. Guerrilla has to some degree a connotation of rebel or fighter attempting to overthrow their own government, which can be a noble cause. It is doubtful anyone today would be critical of the French or Polish resistance in World War Two, or for that matter the Continental Army during the American Revolution. However according to what perspective you are looking at these organizations they could be labeled terrorist. In many ways the definition of terrorist depends on who writes the definition, I have often made the comment (in jest) to friends about how the American Revolution would have been characterized in a history book written after the war if the Americans had lost, I have imagined it would read something like, “an insurrection led by the terrorist George Washington and funded by the outlaw political band, Continental Congress was destroyed by his Majesty’s Imperial Forces during the New York campaign of 1776. However with all that stated it is my belief none of the organizations above meet the descriptions of terrorist. Civilians are often the innocent victim of military conflict and/or revolutions however it becomes terrorism only when civilians become the intentional target(s) of violent activity.

            States are cautious of defining terrorism due to a reluctance to inadvertently label themselves as engaging in terror tactics. This definition: “terrorism is the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings” (Mahan & Griset, 2008, p. 16) is very good and gets to the heart of terrorism. However it is too general and, does not take nation-states off the hook. During international and internal conflict it is easy to find examples of terror-like tactics employed by governments. The infamous burning of Atlanta and subsequent march through the south by W.T. Sherman’s forces in 1864 during the American Civil War, the bombings of Tokyo, Dresden, and the Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War Two, and the current Syrian Government’s crackdown on pro-reform demonstrators are just a few examples of nation-state activity that could be defined as terrorism, depending on whose definition is used. My definition, the FBI’s and the definition in the United States Code all make provisions for a non-state actor or a non-governmental agency which would in fact let governments off the hook. I in no way mean to imply governments are off the hook entirely as they can and should still be held accountable for war-crimes/crimes against humanity, as Slobodan Milosevic was after the Yugoslavian Civil War.

            Defining terrorism is a difficult and tricky task, many organizations have differing definitions, but there is a similar thread that tends to link all of them together, however once defined governments must be careful to avoid implicating themselves. Like the somewhat shadowy nature of terrorist organizations defining terrorism leads one into a grey and potentially hazardous verbal landscape.

Arab League. (n.d.). Arab Convention on Terrorism. Retrieved from Al-Bab.com: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm

Definitions of terrorism. (n.d.). Retrieved from about.com: http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/ss/DefineTerrorism_5.htm

FBI. (n.d.). What We Investigate. Retrieved from FBI.gov: http://www.fbi.gov/albuquerque/about-us/what-we-investigate/priorities

Ganor, B. (2005). The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.

Mahan, S., & Griset, P. L. (2008). Terrorism in Perspective. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.

U.S. Relations with Israel

This is an Essay I wrote for my American Foreign Policy class. I thought since I had not blogged in a while I would  post this for anyone to read. There is some very interesting information here and while I think it is a bit disjointed in spots overall its worth reading.

The relationship between the United States and the State of Israel has been a long and often uncomfortable one. The foreign policy approach to Israel by the U.S. has changed over the years. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is a controversial one in a region noted for its strategic value, and ongoing turmoil. The U.S. should reconsider its Israeli policies however, given that a broader Middle Eastern policy inclusive of Israel while more inclusive of Arab priorities would increase U.S. prestige in the region and facilitate diplomatic solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflicts.   

            This paper will be a brief overview of U.S. Foreign Policy pertaining to Israel, how it has developed, and implications of the U.S.-Israeli alliance.

            Israel was created by U.N. Mandate in 1948 (Spiro 2012). The mandate was for a two-state partition of Palestine, one state a Jewish homeland, the other a Palestinian state composed mostly of Muslims, with a Christian minority. The partition was to be based on demographics, land areas with a majority Arab Population going to the Palestinians, a Jewish majority becoming part of Israel (Spiro 2012). Jerusalem was to be an international city (Spiro 2012). Multiple neighboring Arab states declared war on Israel including Egypt, Transjordan (now Jordan), Syria, Iraq and Lebanon (Spiro 2012). This was the beginning of a series of conflicts between Israel and her neighboring Arab states (Spiro 2012) which have continued off and on into the 21^st century.

            President Harry Truman officially recognized Israel on May 15^th 1948 (Mark 2002); the initial U.S. policy was sympathetic to the Jewish state, to some degree from sympathy for those who survived the holocaust. The U.S.-Israeli relationship has changed over the years, with Israel becoming the primary U.S. ally in the Middle-East.

            However in some degree this is a continuation of the foreign policy initiated by the Allies at the end of World War One. Policies which tended to antagonize both the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab States. Much of this begins with the Balfour Declaration.

            The Balfour Declaration of 1917 penned by Great Britain’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Shlaim 2005), was a crucial element in Israeli history while it was embraced by Jewish Zionists who immigrated to Palestine, it was rejected by Palestinians and in the broader Arab-Muslim world. The Balfour Declaration promised to give Palestine as the Jewish homeland. However this ran counter to what Hussein Sharif of Mecca and his son Prince Feisal had been promised by the British (Shlaim 2005). Hussein and Feisal had used their influence to support the British against the German allied Ottoman Empire. Feisal in conjunction with British troops, and advised by the legendary T.E. Lawrence, led an Arab rebellion against the Turks. This rebellion helped secure Palestine and assisted in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. However an Arab Kingdom united under Feisal with a “Jewish Province” was to be a short lived dream. France under the Sykes-Picot agreement took control of “Greater Syria” (modern Syria, Jordan and Lebanon) while Britain had the mandate in Palestine (Shlaim 2005). The British Mandate lasted until 1948 and the creation of the State of Israel (Shlaim 2005). The Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement led to a feeling of betrayal by the European powers and contributed to friction in the Middle East beginning from 1920 to the 1948 war and after. To this day Balfour and Sykes-Picot are contentious issues of debate regarding Middle Eastern diplomacy.

            The U.S. has often fielded multiple competing policies in the Middle East. Since the 1960’s Israeli security has been an American interest, partly for containment of the Cold War Soviet threat. The Soviets had interest in many Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, meaning the U.S. had to maintain its interest in Israeli security and maintain relations friendly enough with the Arab states to mitigate Soviet influence (Mark 2002). The U.S. did this while developing open markets and free trade and security of the large oil reserves located mostly in Arab states, a tricky balancing act (D.L. 2019).

            The foreign policy relationship of the two nations however was not without its share of problems. Initially the U.S. did not supply arms to Israel, even though Israel was surrounded by actively hostile nations. The Eisenhower Administration was opposed to the combined Israeli/British/French attempt to gain control of the Suez Canal in 1956 (Oren 2002). The U.S. has often been critical of Israeli retaliatory strikes, and cautioned Israel both in 1967 and in 1973 not to strike first even with Arab armies poised on Israeli borders. In 1967 the Israelis did strike first, and went on to a stunning series of victories in the Six-Day War (D.L. 2019), in 1973 Israel did not strike first and was caught by attacking Arab armies who nearly reversed the territorial gains from 1967. Only intervention (non-military) (Mark 2002) by the United States averted disaster for Israel. After the Six-Day War the U.S. began supplying arms to the victorious nation (Crewdson 2007). Trade relationships that continues to this day, and creates friction among Arab states that are, interestingly, also arms customers of the United States (Oren 2002).

             As a peace broker the U.S. has been heavily involved in the peace process, such as the agreement between Anwar Sadat’s Egyptian regime and Israel, facilitated by the Carter Administration at Camp David, a peace deal that cost President Sadat his life by assassination. The Clinton Administration was involved in the peace process with President Clinton signing the September 28th Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005).

            During the Reagan administration Israel was granted “non-NATO ally” status and granted more access to U.S. weapons stockpiles.  After Iraq initiated Scud missile attacks during the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. provided Israel with Patriot missile batteries.

            An interesting point of friction between the U.S. and Israel was an incident that occurred during the Six-Day War. An American Naval intelligence vessel, the U.S.S. Liberty was attacked by forces of the Israeli military (Crewdson 2007). This attack was carried out over the course of several hours and included both aerial and surface attacks, including a torpedoing which nearly sunk the Liberty. (Anthony 2002). Crewmembers stated they were over flown by Israeli aircraft for hours before the attack and felt as if they had been identified as American. Later, and in international waters, the attack began and continued for several hours. Several crewmen were killed and many more were wounded (Anthony 2002) (Crewdson 2007). The incident was written off as a case of mistaken identity and the U.S. accepted Israel’s apology for the incident (Anthony 2002). Reparations were paid to surviving crewmen, and to the families of sailors killed in the attack (Anthony 2002). Speculation suggests the Israelis did not want the American spy ship to listen in on Israeli plans for an attack into the Sinai desert the next day (Crewdson 2007). Wars have been predicated on much less; however the U.S. went on with no further discussion about the incident. Even today there is little mention of the Liberty Incident in the history books or by either government.    

            As a matter of foreign policy the U.S. gives financial aid to many nations around the world, including the Middle East. Israel has been the recipient of much of that aid. Since 1949 Israel has received: $74,157,600,000. In foreign aid grants and loans, other U.S. aid (12.2% of foreign aid) $9,047,227,200., interest to Israel from advanced payments $1,650,000,000 total equaling out to $84,854,827,200 total benefits per Israeli $14,630 (US Financial aid to Israel-figures, facts and impact 2011). To break this down even further the cost of all of this to the U.S. taxpayer is: Interest costs $49,936,680,000, total cost to American taxpayers $134,791,507,200, cost per taxpayer per Israeli citizen $23,240 (US Financial aid to Israel-figures, facts and impact 2011).

            Additionally many of these loans have been forgiven; between 1974 and 1989 $16.4 billion in military loans were converted to grants. Congress has contributed to Israel’s claim of never having defaulted on a loan from the U.S. by forgiving virtually all loans given to Israel (US Financial aid to Israel-figures, facts and impact 2011).

            The nation of Israel receives approximately one-third of the resources the United States has budgeted for foreign aid. If Israel were an emerging nation there would be more justification for such generous ongoing financial aid. However Israel is not an emerging nation, at least not now. With a GNP exceeding the combined GNP’s of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel ranks as a relatively wealthy and well-off nation (US Financial aid to Israel-figures, facts and impact 2011); it begs the question as to why so much is paid by the American taxpayer. Especially now considering the ramifications of the newly discovered Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean Sea and the potential for energy independence and revenue generation this find represents. Strong lobbies in Washington such as AIPAC, and the Christian-American Zionist movement (The Economist 2010), are part of the unconditional defense for continuing financial aid and military sales to Israel.

            Israel certainly has the right to exist and defend itself and is clearly a partner with the U.S.; however a more equitable relationship is needed. Israel is able to stand on her own economically but given the disparity in numbers between Arab and Israeli armed forces a continuing military alliance is advisable. If the U.S. continues as a peace broker, and distributes aid more evenly, U.S. credibility should build in the region. This will lay a broader foundation for stability; stability in the Middle East is in everyone’s best interest. 

Dead In The Water - The Sinking of the USS Liberty. Directed by Christopher Mitchell. Performed by Nigel Anthony. 2002.

Crewdson, John. "New revelations in attack on American spy ship." Chicagotribune.com. October 2007. http://www.chicagotribune.com/services/newspaper/eedition/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,43090.story (accessed March 2012).

D.L. "Israel and American foreign policy." economist.com. October 10, 2019. http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/10/israel_and_american_foreign_policy (accessed March 2012).

Lind, Michael. "Distorting U.S. foreign policy: The Israel lobby and American power." The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. May 2002. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/218805853?accountid=8289 (accessed March 2012).

Mark, Clyde R. "Israeli-United States Relations." policyalmanac.org. October 17, 2002. http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/archive/crs_israeli-us_relations.shtml (accessed March 2012).

Oren, Michael B. "Does the U.S. finally understand Israel?" Commentary. July/August 2002. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/195882296?accountid=8289 (accessed March 2012).

Papp, Daniel S, Loch K Johnson, and John E Endicott. American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy. Pearson Education, Inc., 2005.

Shlaim, Avi. "The Balfour Declaration and its Consequences." In Yet More Adventures with Brittania: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, by Roger Louis William, 251-270. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Spiro, Rabbi Ken. "The state of Israel." aish.com. 2012. http://www.aish.com/h/iid/48961671.html (accessed March 2012).

The Economist. "American Zion(ism)." Democracy in america. October 2010. www.economist.com (accessed March 2012).

"US Financial aid to Israel-figures, facts and impact." rense.com. September 2011. www.rense.com (accessed March 2012).